

### **University of Florence**

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# Fiscal discipline in the EMU, government performance and fiscal transparency

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## **The lecturer**

#### • CURRENT POSITION

• Professor in Economics at the University of Strasbourg (France)

#### • FIELDS OF EXPERTISE

• Macroeconomic governance, fiscal policy, monetary union, fiscal federalism, fiscal discipline.

#### • PEDAGOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC RESPONSIBILITIES

- Vice-Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Management
- Head of the Master « Macroeconomics and European Policies »

#### • EXPERT ACTIVITIES

• Scientific advisor for the European Parliament (Brussels), Scientific expert for the Committee of the Regions of the EU (Brussels), Scientific expert for the Commissariat général à la stratégie et à la prospective (Centre d'analyse stratégique before 2013), French Prime Minister Service (Paris)



## **Structure of the lecture**

Introduction

- I Potential interaction between fiscal rules and government performance
- II Fiscal transparency : key indicators, interests and limits


Conclusion



## Introduction

- The current situation in the EU ?
- > 27 Member States in the EU (since the UK Brexit at the end of 2019)
- > 20 Member States in the EMU
- Fiscal rules in the EMU in an nutshell
- Stability and Growth Pact (1996)
- First reform (2005)
- Six Pack (2011) and Two Pack (2013)
- > Third reform (2024)
- Two complementary aims :
  - Fiscal discipline => sound public finance
  - Flexibility => to let countries make their job












# I - Potential interaction between fiscal rules and government performance ?

- General framework :
- Urgent need for sound public finance in OECD countries, more especially in the EMU
- Fiscal rules have been on the rise worldwide since the 1990s
- In the EMU : the Stability and Growth Pact + national fiscal rules
- > At the same time : increasing debate on government efficiency/effectiveness/performance
- Government efficiency/effectiveness/performance : what does it mean ?
- "public sector ability to reach objectives with public funds at the lowest possible costs".
- The most in-depth measure of government efficiency : the 'Public Sector Performance (PSP)' indicator proposed by Afonso et al. (2005)
- > Background : Fiscal policy functions thanks to Musgrave (1959) in his seminal article
- > Two main components: opportunity indicators and traditional Musgravian indicators



| Sub Index                      | Variable   |  |  |  |
|--------------------------------|--|--|--|--|
| <b>Opportunity Indicators</b>  |  |  |  |  |
| Administration                 | Corruption   |  |  |  |
|                                | Red Tape   |  |  |  |
|                                | Judicial Independence  |  |  |  |
|                                | Property Rights  |  |  |  |
|                                | Shadow Economy   |  |  |  |
| Education                      | Secondary School Enrolment   |  |  |  |
|                                | Quality of Educational System  |  |  |  |
|                                | Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) scores   |  |  |  |
| Health                         | Infant Survival Rate   |  |  |  |
|                                | Life Expectancy  |  |  |  |
|                                | Cardiovascular Disease (CVD), Cancer, Diabetes or Chronic<br>Respiratory Disease (CRD) Survival Rate |  |  |  |
| Public Infrastructure          | Infrastructure Quality   |  |  |  |
| Standard Musgravian Indicators |  |  |  |  |
| Distribution                   | Gini Index   |  |  |  |
| Stabilization                  | Coefficient of Variation of Growth   |  |  |  |
|                                | Standard Deviation of Inflation  |  |  |  |
| Economic Performance           | GDP per Capita   |  |  |  |
|                                | GDP Growth   |  |  |  |
|                                | Unemployment   |  |  |  |

## Table 7.1Overall public sector performance indicators from a 'government efficiency'<br/>perspective



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
|     | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012  | 2013  | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 |
|-----|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|------|------|------|------|
| AUS | 1.11 | 1.09 | 1.27 | 1.35 | 1.45 | 1.53 | 2.16  | 1.94  | 1.22 | 1.19 | 1.17 | 1.28 |
| AUT | 1.12 | 1.09 | 1.21 | 1.09 | 1.09 | 1.10 | 1.07  | 0.97  | 1.03 | 1.00 | 1.02 | 1.01 |
| BEL | 0.99 | 1.00 | 1.01 | 0.98 | 1.02 | 1.02 | 0.98  | 0.96  | 0.96 | 0.96 | 0.98 | 0.97 |
| CAN | 1.13 | 1.08 | 1.31 | 1.05 | 1.10 | 1.10 | 1.19  | 1.17  | 1.24 | 1.08 | 1.13 | 1.09 |
| CHE | 1.21 | 1.23 | 1.35 | 1.20 | 1.25 | 1.25 | 1.28  | 1.34  | 1.33 | 1.29 | 1.27 | 1.19 |
| CHL | 0.87 | 0.87 | 1.10 | 0.89 | 1.03 | 1.07 | 1.43  | 1.30  | 0.94 | 0.92 | 0.85 | 0.81 |
| CZE | 0.91 | 0.94 | 1.09 | 0.94 | 0.92 | 0.90 | 0.76  | 0.77  | 0.91 | 0.96 | 0.91 | 0.97 |
| DEU | 1.00 | 0.98 | 1.09 | 1.03 | 1.08 | 1.08 | 1.05  | 1.02  | 1.09 | 1.04 | 1.06 | 1.06 |
| DNK | 1.09 | 1.07 | 0.99 | 1.08 | 1.04 | 1.00 | 0.96  | 0.96  | 1.06 | 1.05 | 1.05 | 1.16 |
| ESP | 1.19 | 1.15 | 1.03 | 0.89 | 0.83 | 0.76 | 0.41  | 0.37  | 0.78 | 0.83 | 0.85 | 0.85 |
| EST | 1.00 | 0.99 | 0.40 | 0.95 | 0.79 | 0.91 | 1.02  | 0.86  | 0.94 | 0.89 | 0.93 | 0.94 |
| FIN | 1.05 | 1.07 | 1.05 | 1.07 | 1.05 | 1.04 | 0.84  | 0.89  | 0.95 | 0.91 | 0.97 | 0.99 |
| FRA | 1.14 | 1.06 | 1.01 | 0.99 | 1.00 | 1.01 | 0.96  | 0.97  | 1.00 | 0.97 | 0.99 | 1.01 |
| GBR | 1.11 | 1.08 | 0.89 | 1.02 | 1.00 | 0.96 | 1.02  | 1.02  | 1.11 | 1.07 | 1.07 | 1.02 |
| GRC | 0.95 | 0.95 | 0.82 | 0.87 | 0.61 | 0.42 | -0.22 | -0.12 | 0.62 | 0.64 | 0.67 | 0.71 |
| HUN | 1.01 | 0.76 | 0.82 | 0.83 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.60  | 0.76  | 0.86 | 0.83 | 0.80 | 0.91 |
| IRL | 1.02 | 1.02 | 0.65 | 0.91 | 0.87 | 0.91 | 0.80  | 0.93  | 1.11 | 1.43 | 1.06 | 1.19 |
| ISL | 1.05 | 1.12 | 1.14 | 1.05 | 0.84 | 0.94 | 0.91  | 1.01  | 0.99 | 1.11 | 1.18 | 1.09 |
| ISR | 0.84 | 0.89 | 1.09 | 1.01 | 1.21 | 1.28 | 1.49  | 1.55  | 1.03 | 0.98 | 1.07 | 1.06 |
| ITA | 0.92 | 0.89 | 0.73 | 0.84 | 0.82 | 0.77 | 0.44  | 0.55  | 0.73 | 0.73 | 0.73 | 0.80 |
| JPN | 1.03 | 1.20 | 0.89 | 0.99 | 1.04 | 0.94 | 1.04  | 1.10  | 0.99 | 1.03 | 1.04 | 1.01 |
| KOR | 1.00 | 1.05 | 1.23 | 1.15 | 1.32 | 1.29 | 1.49  | 1.43  | 1.06 | 1.18 | 1.29 | 1.37 |

 Table 3.4
 PSP standardized indicator

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- Investigation of the correlation between fiscal rules and a government efficiency index :
- Do fiscal rules impact government efficiency?
- > Or do governments adopt fiscal rules in response to poor government efficiency?
- > Are efficient governments more likely to use fiscal rules than others or less likely?



# II - Fiscal transparency : key indicators, interests and limits


- Role of fiscal transparency : potentiel impact of government performance
- **IMF definition :** "fiscal transparency could be defined as the government ability to give high quality information on how government raise, spend and manage public resources."
- Comparison with monetary policy transparency :

|                 | Objectives  | Means  | Procedure                                       | Results   |
|-----------------|---|--|---|---|
| Monetary policy | Display a goal<br>(inflation, economic<br>stability)    | Use the<br>communication<br>channels             | Make negotiations<br>and appointments<br>public | Publish and make<br>available the results<br>(inflation statements) |
| Fiscal policy   | Display a goal<br>(deficit,<br>unemployment,<br>growth) | Be transparent about<br>revenues and<br>expenses | Involve the public<br>Use a legal<br>procedure  | Make the actual results accessible and understandable               |

• Implication of the definition: ability to assess access to documents, communication on expected results and achievement of objectives.




IMF fiscal transparency code





- Existing indicators : interests and weaknesses
- generally based on the recommendations of "the good budgetary practice" developed by the IMF and the OECD
- mainly focus on the concepts of access to documents
- > Open Budget Index (OBI) by the International Budget Partnership => since 2006
- ➤ A civil society initiative
- A questionnaire sent to research institutions and civil society organizations about access to some key documents related to fiscal policy
- Score are between 0 and 100 points (minimum score of 61 points to be considered as transparent budget)

Figure 1: Budget transparency in developed countries in 2021 (data from International Budget Partnership,







### Main challenges :

- ✓ Other existing indicators : survey of public administration (potential biais)
- $\checkmark~$  No consensus on methodologic issues
- $\checkmark$  Partial assessment of fiscal transparency
- $\checkmark$  What about transparent communication ?
- $\checkmark$  What about transparency on results ?
- ✓ Potentiel impact on trust in government (especially Ricardian behavior)



## Conclusion

- Fiscal rules, government performance and fiscal transparency in the EMU :
- Relation between fiscal rules and government performance
- but in which direction is the correlation
- > First assessments of transparency but a measure that remains incomplete
- Future avenues for research in Economics:
- Trust and fiscal policy/fiscal credibility/transparence/trust in government (indicators and impact in behavioral macroeconomic models)
- Political cycles/Government announce/disciplinary role of financial markets (2008 crisis and Lizz Truss example)

